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4Comparison of the Supplier System in
China and Japan
Status in the Second Half of the 1990s
This chapter demonstrates, based on the findings of the on-site survey, that the sup-
plier system of the motorcycle industry in China in the second half of the 1990s was
an isolated type, in contrast to the united-type system that existed in Japan. There are
clear differences between the Japanese and Chinese firms. In Japan, makers, sharing
risks with suppliers, attempt to cooperate with them to learn ways to upgrade their
capabilities. By contrast, in China, amid severe selective pressure, makers seek to
upgrade their capability in an isolated manner, predominantly passing the risks on to
suppliers.
Section I looks at China and Japan, comparing the division of roles between makers
and suppliers. Section II discusses how makers make suppliers compete among them-
selves, and Section III discusses the qualitative characteristics of the transaction
relationship between makers and suppliers in the two countries. The analytical frame-
work established in Chapter 1 is mainly dealt with in Section III, but why the frame-
work has to be this way is closely related with the characteristics discussed in Sec-
tions I and II.1
This chapter is primarily based on the findings of the first survey conducted at the
end of the 1990s, but also integrates the findings of the second survey from 2001 to
2003 and supplementary survey in 2004.
I. Greater Role of Suppliers and Weaker Makers
This section compares the division of parts between makers and suppliers in both
qualitative and quantitative terms in the two countries, and the sharing of roles be-
tween them in product development. As a conclusion, it is found that two Chinese
makers, Jialing and Qingqi, differed only slightly from two Japanese makers, Honda
66 CHAPTER 4
and Yamaha, in what kind of the parts they produced in-house or outsource, but their
role in the development process was apparently smaller than that of their Japanese
counterparts. Moreover, it is found that Zongshen, another Chinese firm, only had a
very narrow scope of technological grip, and thus was a different type of maker from
Jialing and Qingqi.
1. High Outsourcing Ratio
Our interviews with firms found that the outsourcing ratio2 of the Chinese makers
in the second half of the 1990s was 60–70% for Qingqi, 65% for Jialing, and about
90%3 for Zongshen. In contrast, the ratio was 80% for Honda’s Kumamoto Factory
(which specializes in small vehicles), about 70% for its Hamamatsu Factory (larger
vehicles), and 73% for the entire motorcycle division of Yamaha. The outsourcing
ratios of Jialing and Qingqi are slightly lower and that of Zongshen is considerably
higher than its Japanese counterparts.
Looking at the outsourcing ratios, there are no major difference between Jialing
and Qingqi and the Japanese makers. The lower outsourcing ratio of Jialing and
Qingqi compared to their Japanese counterparts, by about 10 percentage points,
seems to be a result of their in-house production of engine-related parts such as
clutches, carburetors, valves, and flywheel magnetos and other electrical components
that the two Japanese makers do not produce themselves.
Jialing and Qingqi frequently utilize purchased parts and in-house parts together,
because from the outset they had high in-house production capability as a result of
their full-fledged introduction of important technologies related to those parts, and
because they increased the purchase of parts in the first half of the 1990s to respond to
the sharp growth of production. However, in the second half of the 1990s, when
production plunged, the makers gave priority to in-house parts. At the same time,
there were cases when they had to use purchased parts for technical reasons. In other
words, though they tried to absorb technologies for the parts they introduced, they
were not necessarily successful in developing upgraded versions. They had to rely
upon purchased parts for new models, while using in-house parts for the existing
model.
For instance, Qingqi produced cylinders for larger-displacement engines in-house,
but the cylinders for the old model of the 50 cc, two-stroke engine were mostly
purchased from an external supplier. This is an example of outsourcing low-technol-
ogy and low-value-added parts.4 On the other hand, Jialing’s carburetor is an example
of the outsourcing of a product that the maker could not develop well based on the
absorbed technologies. When Jialing introduced technologies for 70 cc and 125 cc
engines from Honda, it also introduced carburetor technology. Toward the end of the
1990s, in-house carburetors were primarily used for those engines. However, for
90 cc–100 cc derivative models and for models for export, which required stricter
quality standard, it used purchased carburetors from supplier c, a Japanese joint
venture, in which Jialing had a stake.5
Meanwhile, with the Japanese makers, there is no significant mixed usage of in-
house and purchased parts. They also have a greater grasp than their Chinese counter-
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parts of the technologies of purchased parts. The most outstanding example is Honda
which, along with Honda Engineering Co., Ltd., an affiliated engineering firm that
develops and produces major experimental and manufacturing equipment for it, has
more than twenty affiliated suppliers producing important parts. For example, it
purchases carburetor chiefly from a subsidiary, Keihin Corporation. Keihin’s new
product development is essentially conducted as an integral part of Honda’s develop-
ment activities. Although Honda has enormous knowledge and capability for devel-
oping carburetors, it apparently believes that, by outsourcing the development, it can
focus its resources on more valuable activities. The outsourcing ratio of Honda’s
overseas plant in Indonesia is 77 percent, of which 55 percent is bought from eleven
suppliers affiliated with its group. If this is categorized as in-house sub-production
and combined with in-house production, the outsourcing ratio falls to as low as 35
percent.6 The very essence of being a dominant maker is the development and accu-
mulation of total technologies for whole products and sharing this knowledge with
main suppliers.
2. Active Utilization of Purchased Parts
Zongshen, at the time of the survey, was almost totally dependent on purchased
parts except for the engine case machining (which is directly related to appearance
design, its main source of differentiation) and frame (which is also important since it
is the structural backbone of the motorcycle), which were processed and produced by
a subsidiary. Zongshen, after rapidly becoming a maker of engines and finished
vehicles, relying totally on standardized external parts, was trying to gradually ex-
pand the scope of its own technological grip. This stands in stark contrast to Jialing
and Qingqi, which tried to acquire parts technologies in bulk since the 1980s. How-
ever, when compared with their Japanese counterparts, the three makers, though
different in degrees, had a similarly narrow technological grip of whole motorcycles.
Due to their inability to develop their own models, large state-owned makers had to
increase their line-ups to respond to changes in demand in the latter half of 1990s (see
Chapter 3) by actively utilizing purchased parts. This can be seen most prominently in
the purchase of engines.
Qingqi, as of 1998, was producing vehicles loaded with five engine models by
displacement and twelve models by type (Wang 1998). It introduced two-stroke
technology from Suzuki in the first half of the 1990s. When four-stroke engine models
became the mainstream in the market, it first attempted in-house development. But,
then, it began purchasing engines and assembling them to the body in an attempt to
rapidly expand its line-up, having found that the level of challenge for new model
development was high and that suppliers were already available that could produce
the necessary parts.7
3. Dependence on Suppliers for Product Development
In China, makers rely heavily on suppliers for product development.
Table 4-1 shows the source of originals of products, such as design drawings and
sample parts, of twenty-two suppliers interviewed in the first survey. Of the twenty-
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two suppliers, twenty-one received design drawings or sample parts from makers. Not
a single supplier answered that it did the job itself starting from the basic design.8 The
only supplier that answered it did primarily in-house was a cowling supplier, an
(mentioned in Note 32 of Chapter 3). Just like makers, suppliers were also carrying
out minor-change type development.
In the second half of the 1990s, Chinese makers and suppliers became engaged in
joint development, but the engineering observed therein was neither complicated nor
technologically deep.
In China, both “drawings supplied” and “drawings approved” methods (see Note
17 of Chapter 3) were used for determining detailed designs. Jialing and Qingqi are
more inclined toward the “drawings supplied” method.
In the late 1990s, Qingqi was supplying detailed design drawings of parts for
conventional models to four (three suppliers of engine parts and one frame supplier)
out of five suppliers surveyed. It was using the detailed design of the two-stroke
model introduced from Suzuki virtually unchanged. In addition, it had launched a
four-stroke model with minor-change based engineering, using firms l, n, and p to
produce parts, supplying them with detailed designs. However, the design was far
from being complete and tolerance requirements were loose. Suppliers modified them
in accordance with their own technologies and the available equipment, and had the
maker approve them.9 In this sense, procedure-wise, it was “drawings approved.”
Zongshen also employs the “drawings approved” method as a matter of form. New
product development for the maker in the late 1990s meant imitating the latest model
whose standardized parts were not yet in circulation. The targeted new product was
purchased in the domestic or foreign market, disassembled into parts, which were
given to major suppliers as samples, who then conducted measurements, material
analysis, and processing analysis, and developed the final design to make the same
product. Suppliers, through consultations with the maker, added design changes,
which were approved by Zongshen.10
At that time, the precision requirements were low, and neither Zongshen nor its
suppliers had adequate measurement and experimentation equipment. The processing
precision requirements (tolerance) were much looser. For example, a precision re-
TABLE 4-1
SOURCE OF ORIGINALS IN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (N = 22)
Source No.
Mainly supplied by makers: 21
Chiefly both drawings and samples 15
Chiefly samples only 6
Have experience procuring by themselves 6
Mainly developed by themselves: 1
Developed based on existing parts purchased by themselves 1
Designed by themselves from basic planning 0
Source: Interviews with firms.
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quirement of plus or minus 0.02 mm at a certain point of a crankshaft in 2003 was plus
or minus 0.05 mm in the late 1990s. Products were tested in a subjective manner, i.e.,
shock absorbers were pressed by hand to check the feeling and then final design was
determined. In retrospect, the mutual coordination was very crude.11
4. Suppliers Participate in Development by Taking Risks
One large difference between China and Japan is the rule for risk bearing. As shown
in Table 4-2, in the latter half of the 1990s, seventeen out of twenty-two suppliers bore
all the cost for dies and molds when developing new parts. In no cases were the entire
cost borne by the maker. The risk of new product development for parts is borne by
suppliers. In other words, in the motorcycle industry in China, the suppliers are the
major players in developing parts.
Meanwhile in Japan, the practice is for all (or in some cases a portion) of the actual
cost for dies and molds and for trials to be borne by the ordering side, i.e., the makers.
Generally speaking, Chinese makers had weak leadership toward joint develop-
ment in collaboration with suppliers.
TABLE 4-2
SHARING OF COSTS FOR DIES AND MOLDS (N = 22)
Sharing No.
Fully paid by suppliers 17
Partially paid by makers 5
of which 50% paid by makers 1
Source: Same as Table 4-1.
II. Open and Isolated Transactional Relationships
This section considers how makers compelled suppliers of the same parts to compete
against each other.
1. Open Transactional Relationship
As an illustration of the degree of openness (or closedness) and degree of indepen-
dence (or dependence) of the relations between makers and suppliers, we can identify
a “unipolar concentrated type” (hereafter, unipolar type) and “multipolar dispersed
type” (hereafter multipolar type) (Figure 4-1). The unipolar type is a closed hierarchi-
cal organization, in which multilayer groups of suppliers, trading only with a specific
maker, exist under the maker. A multipolar type is an open network-type organization,
in which independent suppliers are equidistant from multiple makers and freely enter
transactional relationships with them. In reality, any firm of any industry can be
positioned somewhere in between the two types.
In the case of the Japanese motorcycle industry, each maker, while maintaining an
influential supplier called its “main supplier” for important functional parts, does
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business with one or two other suppliers, called “competing suppliers.” It is often a
“unipolar supporting type,” in which suppliers keep a special relationship with one
maker as a major partner, while also trading with other makers.
On the other hand, judging from the interviews, the image of the Chinese motor-
cycle industry seems closer to a multipolar type, than the Japanese counterparts.
Eighteen surveyed suppliers of Jialing, Qiangqi, and Zongshen were supplying
their major products to on average of 15 makers other than the above three, and 5 of
the 18 were supplying to over 20 makers. On average, 40.5 percent of the sales of the
major products of those 18 suppliers were accounted for by their major maker part-
ners. These figures are only for major products of each supplier, and since most of the
suppliers were producing other types of parts, their business partners should have
been more multifactorial.
By contrast, in Japan, for example, 90 percent of the sales of one electrical parts
supplier, a subsidiary of Yamaha, came from Yamaha, (equivalent to 60 percent of
Yamaha’s total demand). In the case of one Honda-affiliated supplier of shock absorb-
Unipolar concentrated type
Multipolar dispersed type
Unipolar supporting type
Maker A
Maker A Maker B
Maker A Maker B
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier
Maker B
Fig. 4-1. Classification Showing Degree of Openness and  Independence of the System
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ers, 63 percent of sales came from Honda (93 percent of Honda’s total demand).
2. Endless Pressure for Competition by Multisourcing Identical Parts
In Japan, when certain parts are jointly developed, it is a general practice for them
to be supplied by a single supplier for as long as the model is under production.
Meanwhile, the maker simultaneously purchases parts (of the same category) for
other models from other suppliers and by comparing their performance, chooses one
supplier to participate in the future development of new products. Thus, it circum-
vents the moral hazard involved in single-sourcing.12
In China, as shown in Table 4-3, makers purchased identical parts from two or
more, and very often three or more suppliers at the time of mass production. Typi-
cally, they made decisions regarding the purchase in the following manner: In devel-
oping a new product, one supplier was chosen for parts development. If the product
was a success in the market and mass production began, the maker asked the second
and the third suppliers to produce parts of exactly the same design.13 The maker
ranked its suppliers by their performance in QCD (quality, cost, delivery), using A, B,
C, and D grades, and distributed purchase shares accordingly, e.g., 60 percent share to
rank A suppliers, 30 percent to rank B, and 10 percent to rank C. The ranks changed
frequently, often once every few months, or even monthly in extreme cases. Even if a
supplier succeeded in the development, it was subject to constant pressure, and never
received exclusive benefits from the success.
The merit of multisourcing was to create pressure for improved QCD and reduce
risks of contingencies (delivery failure due to accidents, for example). Further, in
many cases, multisourcing was utilized because many small-size suppliers were un-
able to keep up with the rapid growth of the motorcycle industry and thus the makers’
demand could not be met by a single supplier.
Multisourcing was often observed in the development phase. It was quite common
for a supplier, following a request by the maker to develop certain parts, to carry out a
trial, but for a product developed by another supplier in response to the same request
from the maker to be adopted, meaning that the former had wasted its development
cost.14 Suppliers were constantly subject to such risks.
TABLE 4-3
MULTISOURCING OF IDENTICAL PARTS (N = 22)
Sourcing No.
Usually multisourcing: 20
Two suppliers 2
Three or more suppliers 18
Usually single-sourcing 2
Source: Same as Table 4-1.
Note: After launching of mass production.
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III. Risk Management: System of Risk Shifting
In the following two sections, mechanisms for risk management between makers and
suppliers and for the promotion of capability upgrading based on the framework
presented in Chapter 1 are examined.
1. Shifting Development Risk
The “failure rate” of development is high. In other words, parts are developed in
response to the request of a maker, but the maker often fails to reach the stage of mass
production, and the supplier is unable to depreciate the development cost. Of the
seventeen suppliers questioned, twelve replied that they often experienced develop-
ment failures. Supplier t, a shift transmission gear manufacture, said, “Out of ten
requests to develop new products, three are generally cancelled in the process of
development. In another three cases, the prototypes are produced but not adopted, and
in two cases, the products are adopted but not mass produced and therefore the costs
cannot be depreciated. The remaining two reach mass production and lead to profits.”
In Japan, a new product, once developed by a maker, seldom fails to reach mass
production. As was discussed in Chapter 3, development in Japan involves a relatively
high degree of originality, and therefore, potentially involves a high market risk.
However, due to the thoroughgoing marketing and painstaking organizational engi-
neering with suppliers, the risk is kept low before the launching of mass production.15
In China, since development is “minor-change type,” the market risk is inherently
low if the base model is a model that is selling well in the market (Figure 3-2 in
Chapter 3). However, in the process of subsequent localization, the market risk may
rise. As a result of immature marketing and organizational engineering capability, it
may be difficult for makers to create products that are of good quality and highly
agreeable to consumers. Rather, as they lack knowledge of what sells well, Chinese
makers seem to adopt a method under which they quickly develop products, placing
the risks on the suppliers, and then launch them in the market. If they sell well, they
are mass-produced, and if not, the production is simply discontinued, with the cost
borne by suppliers.
This is most typically shown by the system of whole-lot returns and loss-compen-
sation when defective parts are found. If a sales failure occurs due to a problem with
certain parts after the launching of mass production, makers unilaterally return not
only the problematic parts but all related parts (e.g., a full set of engine parts is
returned if the crankshaft is defective). Five suppliers, when asked about the return
rate, said that unit-wise, between 10–30 percent of their sales to the three makers were
returned as of the end of the 1990s, and that 50–80 percent of them were returned for
reasons that had nothing to do with the suppliers.16 The payment for parts was made to
suppliers following a varied schedule, i.e., when the parts were assembled on the
maker’s line, after the maker shipped vehicles to dealers or upon the makers’ receipt
of sales proceeds, but in any case, in the phase of mass production, suppliers produce
large numbers of parts without receiving payment. The risk of wasting these parts
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seems high. Furthermore, a compensation system is generally included in contracts,
under which the “loss” suffered by the maker as a result of returns from users after
shipment is wholly or partially compensated by the supplier who caused the problem.
In general, immaturity in terms of marketing and organizational engineering capa-
bility on the part of the maker seems to be redeemed by shifting the risks to suppliers.
What is important in this context is that makers fail to seriously pursue the indi-
vidual causes of defects. If this practice continues, it will likely bring about serious
long-term technological stagnation in this industry, where incremental technological
innovation is a key. This point will be reexamined in Chapter 6.
2. Nonpayment
The risks to suppliers are raised even higher by the problem of uncollected pay-
ments, which in the survey was clearly distinguished from normal waiting for cash
payments of bills (normally two-three months). De facto practice in the industry at the
time of the first survey was for the payment of the first transaction a maker owed to its
supplier to be made at the time of the second or subsequent transaction as the need
arose. The maker would not make payment for the first delivery, and if it liked the
parts and wanted more of them, would make a payment (partial in some cases) to the
supplier, and in return would receive the second delivery. The transaction would then
continue in this manner.
According to the interviews with twenty-six suppliers, all makers with the excep-
tion of three Japanese affiliates had payments due to them, and none of the suppliers
were free from uncollected payments.
Uncollected payments seemed serious with the transaction with Jialing and Qingqi,
while they were relatively fewer with Zongshen. According to the five suppliers who
were asked about specific amount, the ratio of uncollected proceeds in 1998 to annual
sales in 1997 was 10%, 12%, and 15% for firm m, o, and d respectively, major
suppliers of Jialing and Qingqi, whereas the ratio for Zongshen’s suppliers, firm t and
r were 6% and 5% respectively. This fact is consistent with the general recognition in
the industry at that time that the problem of uncollected proceeds was more serious in
dealing with state-owned makers.
3. Response of Suppliers
There are three forms of countermeasures taken by suppliers to whom makers pass
on high risks: (i) minimizing risks; (ii) spreading risks; and (iii) shifting risks to a
third party.
First, out of fear of risk-taking, suppliers avoided transaction-specific investments
to the greatest extent possible, and tried to utilize existing technologies and equip-
ment for as many clients as possible. It was a general practice to use dies and molds,
as well as jigs and tools developed to serve a certain maker, to process parts for
another maker. As such, a “de facto standardization” of products was progressing,
starting with the phase of parts development, not only due to the intention of makers,
but also in an unorganized manner by suppliers under the spontaneous and earnest
wish to minimize risk.
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As a measure to spread risks, suppliers were trying to diversify their clients.
Suppliers have always looked for second and third makers who were willing to use the
parts they had developed. In fact, many makers were producing numerous minor-
change models over a few base models, and especially, for odds-and-sods makers in
the third layer and in the after market, there was ample demand for de facto compat-
ible parts that somehow “fit into” the motorcycles that just “run” (meaning that bad
drivability or performance was not seriously considered by consumers).
Another measure, which was more important for suppliers, was the shifting of risks
to second- or lower-tier suppliers. The first-tier suppliers did not pay the second-tier
suppliers in the same manner as makers. For instance, supplier r, a producer of
crankshafts, had secondary suppliers do the cast and forging of most of the parts, and
engaged only in the processing and assembly. All the risks involved in the dies and
molds were assumed by secondary suppliers. It appears that risks were shifted from
makers to the first-tier suppliers, from the first to the second, and from the second to
the third, as if they were minutely dispersed into the vast surplus production capacity
made up of firms and surplus workers who wanted orders and jobs, no matter how
risky.
Another response is for suppliers to add a risk premium onto the price at the point
of sale. According to a privately owned supplier r, when selling parts of the same cost,
it charged about 15 percent more to state-owned makers than to privately owned
makers. Ten percent was for proceeds collection failures, and 5 percent for kickback
to the makers’ staff in charge of purchasing.17
IV. Promotion of Capability Upgrading: Isolated Development under
Harsh Competitive Pressure
1. Promotion of Capability Upgrading in Japan
First, let us discuss the example of a Honda-affiliated supplier, in order to identify
the mechanism under which capability upgrading is incorporated in the Japanese
supplier system.
(1) Establishing Common Objectives and Taking Leadership
Supplier jc, a Honda-affiliated shock absorber manufacturer, received capital par-
ticipation from Honda in the 1970s, when the firm fell into a management crisis. In
subsequent years, by following the path led by Honda, the supplier developed into one
of the leading manufactures of its product in the world.18 Initially, it had frequent
quality problems, but Honda did not make large reductions in the order volume.19
Instead, it dispatched several specialists in quality control and manufacturing tech-
nologies as staff on loan, who gave guidance to the supplier until the first half of the
1980s. This guidance involved basic manufacturing areas, and the experts never
interfered with the expertise of shock absorbers themselves. As jc’s technological
level improved, the loaned employees left. This is an example of a maker nurturing
basic capabilities of a major supplier under its control.
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At the time of the interview, jc saw the following means as effective for upgrading
its capabilities in its transaction with Honda: (i) strengthening management, produc-
tion, and technologies by setting up objectives and tasks in its “medium-term strat-
egy”; and (ii) disclosure of information of future products. An example of (i) was the
various reform plans imposed on group companies by Honda for management im-
provement, such as the introduction of ISO environmental standards. The supplier
said that, “by being within Honda’s circle, we are involved and committed and learn
new methods unknowingly.” Item (ii) involves the prompt disclosure to group firms of
product concepts and new technologies that Honda plans to develop in the next term,
and the development and acquisition of new technologies through joint development.
These activities aim to promote mutual improvements in the area of management
control, in case (i), and in product and technological development in case (ii), through
synchronized and cooperative efforts with the establishment of common objectives,
with Honda at the center. This is different from guidance and nurturing, as we saw in
the past experience of jc. What Honda provides at present is not technology or know-
how. Rather, it is a plan with foresight and leadership to guide the group, which draws
forth the commitment of suppliers and promotes their own upgrading.
(2) Technological Commitment and Broad Capabilities
This does not mean that technological strength is not needed for the maker. Rather,
as mentioned in Chapter 3, Honda’s strength lies in the fact that it possesses a broad
range of technologies that enable it to do what suppliers are doing if the need arises.
Particularly, at a time when the engineering capabilities of suppliers were not as
complete as they are today, Honda often developed expertise for suppliers, and pro-
vided them with guidance.
For instance, in the 1970s, Honda was troubled by breakages of chains, but the
supplier argued that it was a problem with the material, and no improvements were
made. Then Honda, using specially designed experimental equipment in its manufac-
turing equipment division (later Honda Engineering Co., Ltd.) to analyze the break-
age, discovered that the individual link plates that constituted the chain had varied
strength, and that this was caused by improper heat treatment by the supplier. Honda
then developed heat treatment equipment to correct the problem, and provided the
supplier with the equipment. The Honda engineer in charge of this problem said,
“Suppliers have more technological knowledge in their field of speciality. However,
we as users, had to somehow find a technical solution, because we were the ones
being troubled by it.” (Matsuura 2004)20
The above example illustrates that Honda developed and accumulated technologies
along with its suppliers even in areas of supplier expertise, and that to achieve this, it
nurtured adequate internal resources, such as large numbers of engineers in related
departments, with some of them producing various experimental equipment and
tooling.
Generally speaking, a dominant maker has capability for future planning and pow-
erful leadership, as well as a broad range of technological capabilities and a large
amount of capital. Over time, the maker and its suppliers will have mutually enhanced
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their capabilities in the process of the suppliers responding to and pursuing the
common objectives established by the maker. This is a commonly cited merit of a
united-type supplier system led by a powerful maker as mentioned in Chapter 1; the
formation and sharing among firms of a wide range of capability/knowledge that
facilitate better product quality and development performance.
2. Promotion of Capability Upgrading in China
During the interviews in the first survey, Chinese makers said they wanted their
major suppliers to strengthen their capabilities. However, only limited practicable
measures were being taken to this end. There was little in terms of the cooperative
efforts that we find in Japan. Makers were relatively passive in making efforts to
upgrade the capability of suppliers, while suppliers were striving to improve their
capability in an isolated manner amid harsh competitive pressure.
In this subsection, I will examine measures taken for “supplier development”
(Chapter 1), including those categorized as infrastructural arrangements (information
sharing via increased communication) and as transaction-specific arrangements (per-
sonnel interchanges, technological guidance, and financial support), as well as simple
measures to create chances for them within the competitive pressures (Table 4-4).
(1) Lack of Information Sharing
For the three Chinese makers, the main measures for information sharing involved
daily routine business transactions, and, with the exception of Zongshen’s approach,
which had just been started, the content was fairly simple. Namely, in the product
TABLE 4-4
SUPPORT AND COMMUNICATION FROM MAKERS
TO SUPPLIERS (N = 22)
Support and Communication No.
(1) Receive frequent technological guidance:
Yes 1 a
No 21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Have received long-term dispatching of personnel:
Yes 1 b
No 21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3) Opportunities for official information sharingc are available:
Yes 5 d
No 17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(4) Have ever received financial supporte:
Yes 7
No 15
Source: Same as Table 4-1.
a Regarding CAD system.
b Director dispatched by the parent firm (maker).
c Annual suppliers’ conference is excluded.
d Attending board of management of the parent firm (maker).
e Provision of current capital and security etc.
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development phase it involved requests for specifications regarding size and function,
in the trial phase involved evaluations, and in the mass production phase involved
requests for quality improvement.
Makers did not have a grasp of the details of their suppliers’ technologies such as
the level of engineers and equipment and quality control measures, so that they were
unable to evaluate their actual costs. Pricing mostly involved simply following market
prices and results of suppliers’ rationalization efforts, and the distribution of the
proceeds between them was not an issue. Occasionally, makers unilaterally presented
rationalization requirements to suppliers, which often were not fulfilled because they
were not based on the correct shared information.21
With regard to opportunities for information sharing, all twenty-two suppliers were
taking part in annual (or biannual) conferences with makers. The main agendas of
these conferences included annual production, the outlook for product development,
and cost reduction requirements. Due to the drastic market fluctuations at the time,
however, the contents of the conferences were rarely abided by for the subsequent
twelve (or six) months. The conferences failed to act as platforms for establishing
common objectives, as they did in Japan. Also, there were few cases with other
official communication channels. Among the suppliers who answered that they had
such channels (Table 4-4-(3)), three were subsidiaries of Qingqi, which attended
board of directors meetings of the Qingqi Group. And as will be seen in the next
chapter, even these subsidiaries did not share common strategies and trust.
Zongshen, however, was sharing information on a frequent and informal basis, by
communicating with the owners of its privately owned suppliers as needed. In addi-
tion, in 1998, along with suppliers, it launched a monitoring system for quality control
in the workshop, called a “quality assurance system,” in an attempt to achieve mutual
improvements. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Zongshen was
successful in drawing forth suppliers’ commitment.
(2) Personnel Interchanges and Technological Guidance
At the time of the survey, hardly any technological guidance was being provided by
makers to suppliers. Generally speaking, with regards to expertise on individual
functional parts, makers actually had very little technological strength to guide sup-
pliers. However, as is the case with Zongshen’s “quality assurance system,” some
arrangements were being observed to bring together technological know-how and to
conduct monitoring by dispatching personnel for short periods of time.
Hardly any supplier received personnel (managers or engineers) from makers for
long periods. Two suppliers, both subsidiaries of Qingqi, said that they had received
permanent directors, but not technical personnel. No technical staff was sent presum-
ably because the makers did not have a clear technological advantage, and because
minor-change-type development does not require cooperative work at the same level
as required by the joint development of state-of-the-art products and technologies in
Japan.
(3) Investment and Financial Support
Fifteen out of the twenty-two suppliers did not receive any financial support (ex-
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cept for investment) from makers. Of the seven suppliers who said they did, three
were Qingqi subsidiaries, who had received credit guarantees at the time they raised
their current capital. Four suppliers received assistance for development from Zongshen,
but only in small sums (see Chapter 5 for details). The relationship between Zongshen
and its suppliers is seen as identical with the personal relationship between the
owners, and thus a small sum can generate greater commitment.22 In Japan, too,
makers provide little financial support to suppliers without capital affiliations, and
there is little difference between the two countries in this respect.
(4) Providing Competitive Chances
What Chinese makers then recognized as the most effective way to nurture suppli-
ers was to place orders to suppliers in as stable a manner as possible and have them
participate in the development process rather than giving them direct assistance.
Suppliers also saw the merit of entering into a close relationship with a makers as
follows: given equal conditions of quality and price, their products would be given
preference over rival suppliers and they would be given priority in cases of important
product development.
A short-term merit for a supplier for participating in product development is a
relatively high profit rate.23 However in the multisourcing system described earlier,
upon the end of the period when parts for the new product were made by one supplier,
no high profit could be expected. What is more important for a supplier is to upgrade
its own capabilities by taking part in the product development launched by makers.
This point was recognized by most of the suppliers interviewed. Product development
indeed involves risks, but for suppliers who desire to climb the industry ladder, taking
part in development was the major tool for improving their own technological capa-
bilities.
In sum, in the second half of the 1990s, makers had few tools for providing direct
support to suppliers. Although Zongshen had made a conscious effort to launch
cooperative actions by setting up common objectives, it had yet to develop a totally
mature system. The fact that giving chances to suppliers was the greatest support
indicates that the most important driving force for promoting the upgrading of suppli-
ers’ capability came from the pressure of market competition. Compared with Japan,
the commitment of makers to upgrading the capability of their suppliers was passive,
and the method was immature. It may well be that in China toward the end of the
1990s, amid the pressure to compete against a constantly emerging stream of firms,
makers and suppliers alike were seeking to upgrade their capability in isolation.
V. Summary
The supplier system of the two Japanese makers was a united type. Fixed members,
given a direction under a leader (the maker), made efforts toward a given but shared
objective. Suppliers had a decreased freedom of choice for the future, but felt secure.
Under such a system, transaction-specific investment is required, and makers absorb
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the risk to a great extent. This makes it easy to undertake bold product development,
and technology and knowledge can be shared and accumulated through continuing
cooperative development.
On the other hand, the system adopted by the three Chinese makers in the latter half
of the 1990s was generally an isolated type. The relationship between makers and
suppliers was less binding and they had larger freedom to choose their business
partners. Under such a system, makers have a smaller burden, as they pass on risks to
suppliers. Suppliers, in an attempt to circumvent risks, avoid transaction-specific
investment and try to find other business partners. Competitive pressure is a chief tool
for the upgrading of suppliers’ capability, and there are relatively few information
sharing and cooperative efforts.
The above is a broad classification of business relationships between China and
Japan observed at a point in the late 1990s.
This clear dichotomy captures, the author believes, some important long-term
characteristics of industrial development in the two countries. However, when seen in
more detail, in view of how their systems have formed historically, it can be easily
understood that the firms are not inherently so from the beginning, and, at the same
time, that firms are not uniform in either China or Japan. In China, for example,
Zongshen, compared with Jialing and Qingqi, clearly carried out less shifting of risks
to suppliers, and thus had elements of a united type organization in that it made
unique efforts to establish transaction rules and common objectives to acquire a
commitment from suppliers. On the other hand, with Jialing and Qingqi, the opportu-
nistic shifting of risks was normal practice, and their transactions lacked discipline.
The following chapter discusses how this isolated-type supplier system, and in
particular the isolated-type system of mal-discipline that prevailed in the latter half of
the 1990s, was formed, by observing the individual development paths of the three
makers.
Notes
1 For the structure of this chapter, the author has referred to the method used by Fujimoto
(1998).
2 Ratio of externally purchased materials and parts to total manufacturing cost.
3 Ninety percent is an estimated figure. For the reason for the estimation, see Note 30 of
Chapter 5.
4 Interview with Qingqi and supplier l. Qingqi stated, “Products with high quality require-
ment are produced in-house. But outsourcing to specializing suppliers has better cost
efficiency. The purpose of using suppliers is to secure volume, and suppliers are utilized as
a buffer.”
5 Interview with supplier c.
6 Interview at PT Astra Honda Motor in Indonesia on September 25, 2004. The factory
produces only a few models and thus has relatively little need to diversify its source of
supply. In addition, there are very few capable indigenous suppliers that can act as first-tier
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suppliers. From these reasons, the factory may as well be more heavily dependent on group
suppliers than in Japan. Yamaha in Japan, unlike Honda, has only a few major affiliated
suppliers providing electrical parts, casting, etc. And yet, the firm also has advanced
technological knowledge, as it has subsidiaries dealing in basic industrial technologies for
motorcycle production in such fields as casting equipment, machine tooling, and EFI
(electric fuel injection).
7 Qingqi had a four-stroke engine produced by a joint venture maker with Suzuki, but it was
not directly linked with Qingqi’s own production. In 1998 in Chongqing, the maker estab-
lished a joint venture (firm O) with a local privately owned firm to manufacture four-stroke
engines (mostly C100 and CG125 type), but major parts were purchased from the common
suppliers of Zongshen and Jialing.
8 In the case of suppliers c and am, both Japanese affiliates, the original basic design was
done by the Japanese manufacturer making the investment. The suppliers themselves had
no such function and only engaged in design changes for local adaptation.
9 According to supplier l, the detailed design drawings of conventional models were from
Suzuki, with slight modifications by Qingqi. This fact also indicates that Qingqi had a lack
of capability for conducting substantive development at the time. The interviewee stated
that this also applied to supplier l.
10 Interview of the owner of Zongshen in 1998.
11 Interviews with suppliers t, v, w, y, and z. They answered unanimously that the number of
exchanges they had with Zongshen—involving design drawing by the maker, prototyping
by the supplier, and testing and re-drawing by the maker—was generally two or three times,
and at the most four. The number of exchanges remains the same today, but the accuracy
requirements are much higher and the process is more systematic as a result of the introduc-
tion of inspection equipment and well-organized procedural arrangements (Chapter 6).
12 This rule is the same as the automobile industry in Japan, as described in Asanuma (1989).
13 Many makers said that, generally, there was an article in the contract prescribing that
multisourcing should begin when the product entered the phase of mass production and not
before the supplier completed depreciating the cost for dies and molds and for the trials.
However, suppliers said in the interviews that this clause was not strictly observed, and that
multisourcing often began before reaching the agreed purchase lot necessary for depreciat-
ing the development cost.
14 Eight out of eighteen have experienced this.
15 Both makers and suppliers said that in Japan, suppliers had virtually no risk accompanying
transactions with makers, such as product development. The risk was to a great extent
absorbed by the makers. For a quantitative analysis of automobile makers’ absorption of
suppliers’ risks including risks due to demand fluctuation, see Kawasaki and MacMillan
(1987) and Asanuma and Kikutani (1992).
16 Responses to the question about the percentage at the end of the 1990s in the second survey
(firms c, t, v, w, and x). The returned parts were left in stock or sold to other makers or the
aftermarket, depending on the supplier. According to firm c, a Japanese affiliate, the return
rate in Japan is less than 0.1 percent.
17 Though not fully analyzed in this study, the widespread rent-seeking activities and nepo-
tism of maker’s staff in charge of parts purchase seems to be one of the important factors
making transactions unstable in China.
18 In the interview with jc, the directors and senior managers shared the feeling that they had
been “nurtured by Honda.”
19 According to jc, Honda occasionally did not use the parts it delivered as they were insufficient
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in quality, and exchanged them with proper products made by rival suppliers without
notifying jc. This illustrates Honda’s patience in nurturing capable suppliers.
20 The chain supplier had no capital affiliation with Honda. Matsuura, the actual engineer who
developed the method, in the 1970s, also developed a method to improve spark plug quality
by changing the shape of the insulator, and provided it to the spark plug supplier. There are
many engineers in Honda taking on such challenges (Matsuura 2004).
21 For instance, starting in 1997, Qingqi urged suppliers to reduce their annual costs by 30
percent. A 30 percent cost reduction was established as a goal for every supplier, irrespec-
tive of its conditions. There were neither incentives available for achieving the objective,
nor institutionalized penalties. From the very beginning, suppliers regarded it as a slogan
and made no effort (Interview with firm l). On the contrary, Japanese makers try to grasp,
more or less, the details of supplier’s technologies (and hence costs) such as, for example,
the processing costs of bending, cutting, heat treatment, and grinding. Once they decide the
price of the parts or the maker requests the supplier further rationalization, the parties have
discussions based on such shared information.
22 The personal relationship between owners was nearly always mentioned by the privately
owned suppliers in interviews.
23 Zongshen guaranteed 10–15 percent of profits to suppliers for parts involved in new prod-
uct development and 5 percent for conventional parts.
